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Abstract
This paper studies the link between cross-border banking activities and the international
propagation of real and financial shocks. We develop a two-country DSGE model with a
bank capital channel and a financial accelerator, in which banks grant loans to domestic as
well as to foreign firms. The model economy is calibrated to data from the U.S. and Canada.
Our results suggest that following a positive technology shock and a tightening of home
monetary policy, the existence of cross-border banking activities tends to amplify the trans-
mission channel in both the domestic and the foreign country. However, cross-border banking
activities tend to weaken the impact of shocks on foreign and home consumption because of
the cross-border saving possibility between the two countries. Finally, our simulations sug-
gest that under cross-border banking, correlations between macroeconomic variables of both
countries become greater than in the absence of international banking activities. Overall,
our results show sizable spillover effects of cross-border banking on macroeconomic dynamics
and suggest cross border banking is an important source of the synchronization of business
cycles between the U.S. and Canada.
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1 Introduction
The international transmission of shocks − the foreign spillover effects of shocks that originated
at the national level − has drawn attention of many separate literatures, particularly in the
aftermath of the recent global economic crisis. In macroeconomics, it’s well established that
the monetary policy implemented by a specific country affects policy in other countries via the
bank capital, exchange rate and financial accelerator channels (see literature cited below). In
forecasting, dynamic factor models have documented that international variables play a key role
for the forecasting of national macroeconomic aggregates, especially at short horizon (Kopoin
et al. (2013b)), suggesting that shocks originated at a national level have strong cross-border
spillover effects. In finance, the cross-border transmission of financial shocks plays a central role
in the globalization and integration of financial markets worldwide and has been identified as
an important source of contagion episodes. As an example, the recent subprime crisis, while
originating in the United States, also caused a drop in asset prices around the world and led to
a synchronized downturn in most developed economies (see Figure 1 and Table 1).1
One of the key features that made the recent financial crisis so deep and widespread is the
extent and nature of international banking integration, which led to unprecedented transmis-
sion of financial instability. Deteriorations in banks’ national balance sheets represented adverse
shocks to the home country’s economy, but so did deteriorations in the quality of their loans
in abroad countries.2 In such a way, financial instability spread to countries in which domestic
banks had signifiant asset holdings and foreign entrepreneurs found their access to credit re-
stricted even if credit risk conditions in their country had remained unchanged. This suggests
that financial shocks may increase countries’ risk of experiencing financial crises and generate a
synchronization of international business cycles.
The quantitative strength of this mechanism remains uncertain, however. To what extent
does cross-border banking explain the transmission of national and international shocks? Does
1In the international framework, financial contagion occurs when international banks in the domestic country
respond to deteriorations in their balance sheet by reducing cross-border loans to entrepreneurs living in a country
not directly exposed to the initial shock.
2As an illustration, consider a negative shock to the banks’ balance sheets. This shock, coupled with macro-
prudential regulations such as maximum leverage ratio or minimum capital requirement, lead domestic banks to
tighten cross-country loans.
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it generate a strong synchronization of the international business cycles? This paper provides a
framework with which these questions can be analyzed, by considering Canada as the domestic
country and the U.S. as the foreign country. We develop a two-country DSGE model with a
bank capital channel and a financial accelerator, in which banks receive deposits from home and
foreign depositors, and grant loans to home and foreign firms.
Our simulations suggest that following a positive technology shock or a tightening of home
monetary policy, the presence of cross-border banking tends to amplify the transmission channel
in both domestic and foreign countries. However, cross-border banking activities tend to weaken
the impact of shocks on consumption, because of the cross-border saving possibility between the
two countries. These results are consistent with those arrived at in empirical studies using
estimated vector autoregressive models (Markovic (2006), Beaton et al. (2014), Beaton and
Desroches (2011), Teng-Xu (2012)). In addition, our results suggest that under cross-border
banking, bilateral correlations between comparable macroeconomic aggregates become greater
than those present without international banking activities in many cases. Overall, our results
demonstrate sizable spillover effects of cross-border banking on the propagation of shocks and
the synchronization of business cycles.
Table 1: Correlation of change in stock prices
Variables S&P/TSX NASDAQ NIKKEI FTSE100
TSX 1.000
NASDAQ 0.759 1.000
NIKKEI 0.659 0.641 1.000
FTSE100 0.758 0.807 0.637 1.000
Note: This tables provides cross-correlations between four major financial indexes from 2001 to 2012. Data are
from Bloomberg and the International Financial Statistics (IFS).
Previous work on the role of cross-border banking activities in the transmission of national
and international shocks includes Mendoza and Quadrini (2010), who highlight the central role
played by financial globalization in the recent world financial crisis. Although Mendoza and
Quadrini (2010) also analyze financial globalization and spillovers of country-specific shocks,
our setup differs from theirs in three important respects. The first difference is that our model
considers an international credit contract between borrowers and lenders living in two integrated
4
Figure 1: International business cycles synchronization
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Note: This figure illustrates the international business cycles synchronization in the U.S., Canada, UK and Japan.
The top left chart displays the dynamic of GDP growth, whilst the bottom right chart presents the growth rate of
the credit to the private sector in the aforementioned countries. Data are from Bloomberg, canadian socioeconomic
database (Cansim) and International financial statistics.
financial markets with frictions in each market, rather than a global financial market as in
Mendoza and Quadrini (2010). This specificity has the advantage of clearly identifying the role of
financial openness in the transmission of international shocks. The second difference is that their
analysis does not include international trade in the goods market.3 As our model is calibrated
3This channel has also been identified as an important source of shocks transmission (Kopoin et al. (2013b)).
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to US and Canadian data, this feature plays an important role since Canada is the largest
single-country trading partner of the United States.4 As a consequence, our model predicts
consistent bilateral correlations and is more suited to analyze business cycles synchronization.
Finally, in Mendoza and Quadrini (2010), financial intermediaries hold a fixed quantity of the
productive capital (bank capital), in contrast to our model which allows (endogenous) bank
capital accumulation. As consequence, negative shocks to bank capital lead to a reduction in
the supply of loans, and thus to a fall in domestic and foreign investment and output.
Our paper is also close to Dedola and Lombardo (2012), who show that an unexpected
increase in credit spreads in one country generates a similar rise in credit spreads in other
financially integrated countries, independently of the exposure to foreign assets in the balance
sheet of leveraged investors. However, as a model prediction difference, Dedola and Lombardo
(2012) argue that business cycle synchronization is strong even if financial exposure is minimal.
We find that higher financial exposure yields stronger business cycle synchronization. Next,
Guerrieri et al. (2012) analyze cross-country spillover effects of sovereign default in a quantitative
setting calibrated to the euro area and find sizable spillover effects of default from the periphery
to the core through a drop in the volume of credit extended by the banking sector. Finally,
Ueda (2012) uses data from the U.S. and Japan and shows that under globalization of financial
intermediation, adverse shocks that hit one country affect the other, yielding business cycle
synchronization on both the real and financial sides. In contrast to Ueda (2012) and Guerrieri
et al. (2012), our model is calibrated to the two most integrated economies among OECD
countries. In addition, our analysis employs a different financial contract to link investors
and bankers, and includes prices and wages rigidities, which plays an important role in the
transmission of shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the financial contract and
the two-country model. Section 3 illustrates the parametrization of the model and presents the
results of our quantitative simulation. Section 4 concludes.
4The United States and Canada conduct the world’s largest bilateral trade relationship, with total merchandise
trade (exports and imports) of about $429.7 billion in 2009.
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2 Two-country DSGE Model with Financial Frictions
In this section, we describe a two-country model with financial frictions and cross-border bank-
ing. Within each country, there are households, entrepreneurs, bankers, intermediate goods
producers, composite good producers, a monetary authority and a government. The population
masses of workers, entrepreneurs and bankers is the same within each country and is: ηw for
workers, ηe for entrepreneurs and ηb for bankers (ηw = 1 − ηe − ηb). Each period households
supply differentiated labor, rent physical capital and receive lump-sum transfers from the mon-
etary authority. An aggregate household labor input is assembled using a Dixit-Stiglitz form
by a firm that sells it to intermediate goods producers. Households divide their high-powered
money between currency, home deposits and foreign deposits. Bankers raise funds by issuing
deposits liabilities to domestic and foreign households workers and make loans to home and
foreign entrepreneurs.
Each country includes an intermediate goods production sector. In that sector, firms operat-
ing under monopolistic competition and facing Calvo-type pricing friction, use labor and capital
to produce intermediate goods. Next, perfectly competitive firms produce both the domestic
and foreign composite goods, which are then combined to form a final good. This final good is
converted into consumption, investment and government spending. Each country is specialized
in the production of a set of differentiated goods, but consumers in both countries consume
domestic and foreign goods. This micro-founded economic structure has become standard in
the new open economy macroeconomics literature (Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), Kehoe and Perri
(2002), Iacoviello and Minetti (2006), Perri and Quadrini (2011) and Kollmann et al. (2011)).
Entrepreneurs have access to external finance, but the maximum amount they can borrow
depends on their net worth. As well, banks can issue loans to foreign and domestic entrepreneurs,
and banking regulation, in the form of taxation of bank dividends, constrains banks’ choices,
so that lending cannot grow as freely as banks would want. Entrepreneurs use borrowing as
well as their own fund to finance projects that result in the production of new capital goods.
The model includes a financial accelerator mechanism as in Bernanke et al. (1999), because of
an asymmetric information problem between borrower and lenders. Additionally, the model
includes bank capital and exchange rate channels as described in Kopoin et al. (2013a), because
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of an asymmetric information problem between lenders and depositors, and the presence of an
international goods market.5 As the focus of our analysis is to investigate how cross-border
banking activities and leverage constraints affect the international propagation of shocks across
countries, we analyze separately whether leverage constraints are binding or not.
The two economies are similar in size and in the composition of agents, but are heterogeneous
in their financial regulation systems. There is international trade in goods, whereas labor is
assumed to be immobile across countries. The timing of events is summarized in Figure 2 and
is as follows: at the beginning of each period, productivity and monetary policy shocks are
realized in the home and foreign country. Intermediate goods are then produced, using capital
and labor services and final goods are produced, using intermediates. Next, households make
deposits in the foreign and domestic banks, entrepreneurs choose which project to undertake
and banks combine households deposits and their own capital to finance project submitted by
entrepreneurs and choose whether to monitor. In the last step, successful projects return of new
capital is shared between the three agents according to the terms of the financial contract, and
exiting agents transform their capital goods into consumption goods. Surviving agents make a
consumption-savings decision.
Figure 2: Timing of events within each country
• • • •
Productivity
shocks
realize
Intermediate
goods are
produced
Entrepreneurs
submit
projects
Sharing of
project
return
Surviving
make C-S
decision
• • • • •
Monetary
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Lending
decision by
Bankers
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agents
consume
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close (Aggre-
gation)
t
•
t+ 1
•
5The bank capital channel may be interpreted as a financial accelerator mechanism on the supply side (inter-
action between households savers and banks) and the exchange rate arises because of the impact of real exchange
rate to the cost of commodity imports and to the foreign demand for composite goods production firms.
8
2.1 The Financial Contract
Our setting of bank financing is based on the costly state verification (CSV) model developed
by Bernanke et al. (1999) and Christiano et al. (2010), which we extend to allow cross-border
lending and borrowing. The home country is denoted by the superscript h, and the foreign
country by the superscript f . The basic idea of the financial contract is as follows: in period t,
a representative entrepreneur in the home country borrows a fraction θeh of its total financing
needs from the home financial system and 1− θeh from the foreign financial system. Conversely,
a representative entrepreneur in the foreign country engages in a credit contract by borrowing
a fraction θef from the foreign financial system and 1− θef from the home financial system, with
0 < θeh, θ
e
f < 1. In this context, θ
e
h and θ
e
f capture the degree of cross-country borrowing, which
may be interpreted as the degree of financial globalization. On the supply side, domestic banks
receive a fraction θbh and 1 − θbf of deposits from home and foreign workers, respectively, and
make loans to the home and foreign entrepreneurs. Correspondingly, foreign banks receive a
fraction θbf and 1− θbh of deposits from foreign and domestic investors. Let Dh,t and Df,t denote
the total amount of deposits held by the home and foreign investors. Figure 3 describes the
cross-border financial activities between borrowers and lenders.
Figure 3: Chained financial contract
Foreign country
Home country
Home
household
Home bank
Home
entrepreneur
Foreign
household
Foreign bank
Foreign
entrepreneur
(1−
θ b
h )D
h
(1−
θ e
h )L
h
θbhDh θehLh
(1
− θ
b
f
)Df
(1
− θ
e
f
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f
θbfDf θefLf
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2.1.1 The demand side of the credit contract
Entrepreneurs in the home country are assumed to be risk-neutral agents and each has a constant
probability τ eh of surviving to the next period, which implies an expected lifetime of 1/(1−τ eh). As
well, a representative entrepreneur in the foreign country has an expected lifetime of 1/(1− τ ef ).
This assumption precludes the possibility that the entrepreneurial sector will accumulate enough
wealth to be fully self-financing. Entrepreneurs’ net worth comes from supplying labor to in-
termediate goods producers and from profits accumulated from previous investments. Finally,
following the CSV literature, we assume that the financial intermediary must pay a cost to
observe the entrepreneur’s realized return on capital.
A. Entrepreneurs and bankers in the home country
At the end of period t (going into period t+1), entrepreneur j in the home country combines
net worth N eh,t+1(j) with bank loans to purchase new physical capital. The value of capital pur-
chased in the home country is θehQh,tKh,t+1, where Qh,t is the unit-price of capital at time t in
the domestic country. Following Bernanke et al. (1999), we assume that the return to capital in-
vested is subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk: denote the ex-post aggregate return to
capital by ωhRkh,t+1 in period t+ 1, where ωh is an idiosyncratic disturbance that affects project
in the home country. This disturbance is constant across all entrepreneurs and is lognormally dis-
tributed with a cumulative distribution function demoted by Ft(ωh).
6 The debt borrowed by this
entrepreneur from the home financial intermediary is Bh,t+1(j) = θeh(Qh,tKh,t+1(j)−N eh,t+1(j)),
while the complementary amount to run the entrepreneurial project is borrowed from the foreign
financial intermediary.
Definition 1 : A financial contract is characterized by: (i) The amount of debt that
a representative entrepreneur borrows from the home financial intermediaries: Bh,t+1(j) =
θeh(Qh,tKh,t+1(j) − N eh,t+1(j)); (ii) The threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock ωh, defined
as ωh, such that entrepreneur repays its debt for ωh ≥ ωh and declares default for ωh < ωh; (iii)
6The mean and standard deviation of log(ωh) are 1 and σωh . In contrast to Christiano et al. (2010), we assume
that the risk profile of entrepreneurs is constant over time.
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The loan rate that the entrepreneur repays when he does not default, Zh,t+1.
As defined above, when ωh ≥ ωh, the home entrepreneur pays the home financial interme-
diary an amount of θeh(ωhE
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1) and keeps θeh(ωh − ωh)E
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1.
Otherwise, if ωh < ωh, the entrepreneur receives nothing, and the financial intermediary audits
the entrepreneur by paying a monitoring cost θehµωhE
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1, with 0 < µ < 1, and
thus receives net receipts of (1 − µ)θehωhE
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1. If Zh,t+1 is the loan rate, then,
the home entrepreneur repays a promised debt amount of Zh,t+1Bh,t+1 when ωh ≥ ωh and keeps
net receipts θeh(ωhE
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1 − Zh,t+1Bh,t+1).
Formally, at the end of period t, expected payoffs of the entrepreneur and the banker are
given by V eh,t+1(ωh,Rkh,t+1) and V bh,t+1(ωh,Rkh,t+1), where
V eh,t+1(ωh,Rkh,t+1) =
 θ
e
h(ωh − ωh)E
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1 if ωh ≥ ωh
0 if ωh < ωh
and
V bh,t+1(ωh,Rkh,t+1) =
 θ
e
hωhE
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1 if ωh ≥ ωh
θeh(1− µ)ωhE
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1 if ωh < ωh.
The entrepreneur is able to repay its loans at the contractual rate equal to the non-default
loan rate Zh,t+1 if the idiosyncratic shock ωh is greater than ωh. Consequently, the threshold
value of the idiosyncratic shock ωh and the non-default loan rate are jointly defined as follows:
Zh,t+1 =
ωhE
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1
Qh,tKh,t+1 −N et+1
. (2.1)
Bankers face an opportunity cost of funds in period t equal to the economy’s riskless gross rate
of return Rh,t+1. An incentive compatibility condition for a banker to participate in the financial
contract is therefore (ωhPr(ωh ≥ ωh) + (1− µ)E[ωh | ωh < ωh]Pr(ωh < ωh)) E
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1 ≥
Rh,t+1Bh,t+1, which may be expressed as: Rh,t+1Bh,t+1 ≤ (1−µ)
∫ ωh
0 ωhE
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1dF (ωh)+
(1− F (ωh))Zh,t+1Bh,t+1. Combining this equation with the threshold value of the idiosyncratic
shock, this incentive constraint may be expressed as:
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Rh,t+1 ≤
(Γ(ωh)− µG(ωh)) E
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1(
Qh,tKh,t+1 −N eh,t+1
) , (2.2)
where
Γ(ωh) =
∫ ω¯h
0
ωhdF (ωh) + ωh
∫ ∞
ωh
dF (ωh)
µG(ωh) = µ
∫ ωh
0
ωhdF (ωh).
This condition requires that the expected return on loan paid to the financial intermediary,
net of auditing cost (in the case of default), should be greater than or equal to the financial
intermediary’s opportunity cost of lending. The home entrepreneurs could purchase capital
goods, using their own net worth without entering a financial contract.
We impose a participation constraint to the entrepreneurs specified by∫∞
ωh
ωhE
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1dF (ωh) − Zh,t+1Bh,t+1 ≥ E
[
Rkh,t+1
]
N eh,t+1, which states that it is
more profitable for them to participate in the contract. Using the threshold value of the idiosyn-
cratic shock, this participation constraint may be rewritten as: [1− Γ(ωh)] E
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1 ≥
E
[
Rkh,t+1
]
N eh,t+1.
B. Home bankers and foreign entrepreneurs
The foreign representative entrepreneur engages in a credit contract with the home financial
intermediary to finance the difference between its expenditures on capital goods and its net
worth. As in the home country, entrepreneurs in the foreign country are also subject to an id-
iosyncratic shock ωf .
7 The participation constraint of the foreign entrepreneur may be specified
as: (
1− F (ωf )− ωf
∫ ωf
0
dF (ωf )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−Γ(ωf )
E
[
Rkf,t+1
]
Qf,tKf,t+1 ≥ E
[
Rkf,t+1
]
N ef,t+1 (2.3)
Given the participation constraint, the amount of capital purchased by foreign entrepreneur
using loans from the home financial intermediary is (1 − θef )ΥtQf,tKf,t+1, where Qf,t is the
7As in the home country, we assume that ωf follows a log-normal process.
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price paid to capital in units of the household consumption index in the foreign country. Home
financial intermediary faces to an incentive compatibility condition in the credit contract with
foreign entrepreneur. This incentive condition may be expressed as:
Rf,t+1 ≤
(Γ(ωf )− µG(ωf )) E
[
Rkf,t+1
]
Qf,tKf,t+1(
Qf,tKf,t+1 −N ef,t+1
) , (2.4)
Proposition 1 : Given the participation constraint of the entrepreneur and the incentive
constraint of financial intermediary, the expected return received by the non-default entrepreneur
in the home country may be expressed as:
V eh,t(θ
e
h, θ
e
f ) =θ
e
h (1− Γ(ωh)) E
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1
+ (1− θeh)Υt (1− Γ(ωf )) E
[
Rkf,t+1
]
Qf,tKf,t+1,
(2.5)
Proposition 2 : Combining equation 2.3 and 2.4, the expected return on loan contract
paid to the home financial intermediary when engages loan contract with the home and foreign
entrepreneur is given by:
V bh (θ
e
f , θ
e
f ) ≡θeh (Γ(ωh)− µG(ωh)) E
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1
+(1− θef )Υt (Γ(ωf )− µG(ωf )) E
[
Rkf,t+1
]
Qf,tKf,t+1,
V bf (θ
e
f , θ
e
f ) ≡(1− θeh) (Γ(ωh)− µG(ωh)) E
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1
+θefΥt (Γ(ωf )− µG(ωf )) E
[
Rkf,t+1
]
Qf,tKf,t+1,
(2.6)
where Υt is the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate is used to express earnings in
household consumption index in the foreign country to the units of the household consumption
index in the home country.
Proposition 3 : Denote by ∇eh = N eh,t+1/Qh,tKh,t+1 and ∇ef = N ef,t+1/Qf,tKf,t+1, the debt
to equity ratio in the home and foreign country. Then, given the incentive constraints faced by
13
the financial intermediary in the home and foreign credit contract:
∃ Zbh,t+1, Zbf,t+1 ∈ [min(Rf,t+1, Rh,t+1),max(Rh,t+1, Rf,t+1)] defined as the expected return
earned by the home and foreign financial intermediary on the loans to entrepreneur such that:
Zbh,t+1 =
1−∇eh(
1−∇eh
)
+∇eh,f/h
(
1−∇ef
)Rh,t+1 + 1−∇ef(
1−∇ef
)
+∇eh,h/f
(
1−∇eh
)Rf,t+1,
Zbf,t+1 =
1−∇eh(
1−∇eh
)
+∇ef,f/h
(
1−∇ef
)Rh,t+1 + 1−∇ef(
1−∇ef
)
+∇ef,h/f
(
1−∇eh
)Rf,t+1 (2.7)
where ∇eh,f/h =
(
(1− θef )ΥtQf,tKf,t+1
)
/θehQh,tKh,t+1, and ∇eh,h/f =
(
∇eh,f/h
)−1
. ∇ef,f/h =
θefΥtQf,tKf,t+1/ ((1− θeh)Qh,tKh,t+1), and ∇ef,h/f =
(
∇ef,f/h
)−1
. In this specification, ∇eh,f/h
is defined as the ratio of capital borrowed by the foreign entrepreneur relative to the capital
borrowed by the home entrepreneur from the home bank. Equation (2.7) shows that in absence
of cross-border borrowing, the expected return earned by the each bank is the economy’s riskless
gross rate of return.
Proof. Appendix. .
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Equation (2.7) shows that when the risk-free rate in the home country is equivalent to the that
in the foreign country, Rh,t = Rf,t, then the opportunity cost face by the representative banker is
independent to the the size of the cross-border banking, Zbh,t+1 = Rh,t = Rf,t, ∀ θeh, θef ∈ (0, 1).
As consequence, for given entrepreneurs with a same risk profile, bankers is indifferent in the
financing of home and foreign projects. Figure 4 illustrates the expected return of the home
bank for 3 cases: the blue line describes the case where the home and foreign risk-free rate are
arbitrary set to 3% in annual basis. The red and green lines present the cases where the home
risk-free rate is 3.5% and 2.5% respectively, while the foreign risk-free rate is set to 3%. Figure 4
shows that as the home loan relative to foreign loan increases, the expected return of the home
bank tends to approximate the home risk-free rate.
2.1.2 The supply side of the credit contract
The supply side of the credit contract specifies the deposits contract between financial inter-
mediaries and depositors. In period t, the home bank receives a fraction of home deposits,
θbhDh,t+1, and a fraction of foreign deposits, (1− θbf )Df,t+1, from the home and foreign workers,
respectively. In our specification, we consider a continuum number of financial intermediaries
indexed by j ∈ (0, ηb). A representative financial intermediary in the home country com-
bines deposits received and its own net worth Ah,t+1(j) to satisfy loans demand θehLdh,t+1(j) ≡
θeh
(
Qh,tKh,t+1(j)−N eh,t+1(j)
)
, and (1− θef )Ldf,t+1(j) ≡ (1− θef )
(
Qf,tKf,t+1(j)−N ef,t+1(j)
)
to
the home and foreign entrepreneurs, respectively. In this specification, Ldh,t+1 and Ldf,t+1 denote
the total demand of loans in the home and foreign country. The home bank and the foreign
bank face a minimum capital requirement constraint: this constraint specifies that their date t
capital should not be smaller than a fraction ιh of the bank’s assets Ah,t+1. Formally, the loans
demand in the home country and its loanable fund function may be expressed as:
 L
d
h,t = θ
e
h
(
Qh,t−1Kh,t −N eh,t
)
+ (1− θef )Υt
(
Qf,t−1Kf,t −N ef,t
)
Lsh,t = (1− ιh)Ah,t + θbhDh,t + (1− θbf )ΥtDf,t
Similarly, the loans demand in the foreign country and its loanable fund function may be
expressed as:
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 L
d
f,t = (1− θeh)
(
Qh,t−1Kh,t −N eh,t
)
+ θefΥt
(
Qf,t−1Kf,t −N ef,t
)
Lsf,t = (1− ιf )ΥtAf,t + (1− θbh)Dh,t + θbfΥtDf,t
where Af,t+1 denotes the foreign financial intermediaries equity and ιh and ιf are the capital
requirement ratios in the home and foreign country, respectively. Given the total loans demand
in each country, the home and foreign banks’ budget constraints are:
In the home country:
(1− ιh)Ah,t+1 + θbhRDh,tDh,t+1 + (1− θbf )ΥtRDf,tDf,t+1 ≤
+ θeh [Γ(ωh)− µG(ωh)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ(ωh)
E
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1 + (1− θef )Υt [Γ(ωf )− µG(ωf )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ(ωf )
E
[
Rkf,t+1
]
Qf,tKf,t+1
(2.8)
In the foreign country:
(1− ιf )ΥtAf,t+1 + (1− θbh)RDh,tDh,t+1 + θbfΥtRDf,tDf,t+1 ≤
+ (1− θeh) [Γ(ωh)− µG(ωh)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ(ωh)
E
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1 + θefΥt [Γ(ωf )− µG(ωf )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ(ωf )
E
[
Rkf,t+1
]
Qf,tKf,t+1
(2.9)
2.1.3 The optimal financial contract
In the home country, the optimal financial contract consists of a maximization of the home en-
trepreneur expected return, V eh,t+1(ωh,Kh,t+1), given to incentive compatibility constraint of the
home and foreign financial intermediary. In the foreign country, the optimal financial contract
also consists of a maximization of the foreign entrepreneur expected return, V ef,t+1(ωf ,Kf,t+1),
given to incentive compatibility constraint of the home and foreign financial intermediary.
Formally, the optimal financial contract between entrepreneur and bank consists to choose
the size of new capital (investment) and the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock that
maximizes the end-of-contract level of net worth for entrepreneur subject to the bank’s zero
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profit condition.
max
Kh,t+1,ωh
(
θeh (1− Γ(ωh)) E
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1 + (1− θeh)Υt (1− Γ(ωf )) E
[
Rkf,t+1
]
Qf,tKf,t+1
)
s.t.
 V
b
h,t+1(ωh,Kh,t+1) ≥ Zbh,t+1
[
θeh
(
Qh,tKh,t+1 −N eh,t+1
)
+ (1− θef )Υt
(
Qf,tKf,t+1 −N ef,t+1
)]
V bf,t+1(ωh,Kf,t+1) ≥ Zbf,t+1
[
θefΥt
(
Qf,tKf,t+1 −N ef,t+1
)
+ (1− θeh)
(
Qh,tKh,t+1 −N eh,t+1
)]
(2.10)
max
Kf,t+1,ωf
(
Υtθ
e
f (1− Γ(ωf )) E
[
Rkf,t+1
]
Qf,tKf,t+1 + (1− θef ) (1− Γ(ωh)) E
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Qh,tKh,t+1
)
s.t.
 V
b
h,t+1(ωh,Kh,t+1) ≥ Zbh,t+1
[
θeh
(
Qh,tKh,t+1 −N eh,t+1
)
+ (1− θef )Υt
(
Qf,tKf,t+1 −N ef,t+1
)]
V bf,t+1(ωh,Kf,t+1) ≥ Zbf,t+1
[
θefΥt
(
Qf,tKf,t+1 −N ef,t+1
)
+ (1− θeh)
(
Qh,tKh,t+1 −N eh,t+1
)]
(2.11)
The first order conditions of the problem are the first order necessary conditions associated
with the optimization problem, and the zero profit condition in each country:
E
[
Rkh,t+1
]
Zbh,t+1
=
χ1θ
e
h + χ2(1− θeh)Zbf,t+1/Zbh,t+1
θeh [1− Γ(ωh)] + [Γ(ωh)− µG(ωh)]
[
χ1θeh + χ2(1− θeh)
] , //Kh,t+1
F (ωh) = 1− [1− F (ωh)− µωhf(ωh)] χ1θ
e
h + χ2(1− θeh)
θeh
. //ωh
(2.12)
E
[
Rkf,t+1
]
Zbft+1
=
χ1(1− θef )Zbh,t+1/Zbf,t+1 + χ2θef
θef [1− Γ(ωf )] + [Γ(ωf )− µG(ωf )]
[
χ1(1− θef ) + χ2θef
] , //Kf,t+1
F (ωf ) = 1− [1− F (ωf )− µωff(ωf )]
χ1(1− θef ) + χ2θef
θef
. //ωf
(2.13)
where χ1 and χ2 represent the Lagrange multipliers associated with the bank’s zero profit
condition in the home and foreign country, respectively. Denote by:
∆m =
[1− F (ωm)]
[1− F (ωm)− µωff(ωm)] , m ∈ (h, f) (2.14)
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then, the Lagrange multipliers are :
χ1 =
[
θef (1− θeh)∆f − θehθef∆h
]
[
1− θeh − θeh
] , χ2 =
[
θeh(1− θef )∆h − θehθef∆f
]
[
1− θeh − θeh
] . (2.15)
Proposition 4: After substituting out the expression for Lagrange multipliers and rearrang-
ing, the expected discounted return to capital for entrepreneur is given by:
E
[
Rkh,t+1
]
/Zbh,t+1 ≡ ψh
(
∆h,∇eh,∇ef ,∇eh,f/h, θeh, θef , Rh,t+1, Rf,t+1
)
,
E
[
Rkf,t+1
]
/Zbf,t+1 ≡ ψf
(
∆f ,∇eh,∇ef ,∇ef,h/f , θeh, θef , Rh,t+1, Rf,t+1
)
.
When θeh = 1 and θ
e
f = 1, we obtain the no cross-border borrowing results in the Bernanke et al.
(1999), in which the return to capital will be equated to the marginal cost of external finance in
equilibrium for each country.
2.1.4 Dynamic behaviour of net worth
Following the timing of events described in Figure 2, once the representative entrepreneur has set-
tled its international debt contract, the accumulated capital is sold back to capital producers and
the entrepreneur’s net worth in period t+ 1 is then determined. At this step, a fixed fraction of
entrepreneurs and bankers exit the economy and a fraction of their total accumulated net worth
is consumed, surviving agents save all their accumulated net worth. As mentioned in Christiano
et al. (2010), net worth transfers are relatively small, which helps to ensure that entrepreneurs
and bankers do not accumulate enough net worth to escape the financial frictions. FInally, if
V eh,t and V
e
f,t are the accumulated wealth by home and foreign entrepreneurs, then the aggregate
entrepreneurial net worth of the home entrepreneur, N eh,t, and the foreign entrepreneur, N ef,t at
the end of period t are given by: N eh,t = τ ehV eh,t + ηeWeh,t, N ef,t = τ efV ef,t + ηeWef,t. Likewise,
the bank capital accumulated by the home and foreign banker are: Ah,t+1 = τ bhV bh,t + ηbWbh,t,
Af,t+1 = τ bfV bf,t + ηbWbf,t, where V eh,t, V bh,t, V ef,t and V bf,t are defined above.
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2.2 The General Macroeconomic Environment
We now embed contracting problem between bankers and entrepreneurs within a two-country
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. This will allow to endogeinize the risk-free inter-
est rate in both countries, as well as the return to capital and the relative price of capital, which
were taken as given in the previous pages. To do so, we add to the model important agents such
as households, retailers, a government sector that conducts fiscal policy and a central bank that
formulates and implements monetary policy.
2.2.1 Households
Preferences and endowments: The economy of each country is composed of a continuum
of infinitely-lived households of mass ηw indexed by i ∈ (0, ηw). In each country, households
obtain utility from consumption and the liquidity services of holding money, while they receive
disutility from contributing work effort to the production of intermediate goods. The preferences
of the representative household i in the home country are given by the following lifetime utility
function, separable into consumption, real money balances and hours worked:
Et
{ ∞∑
l=0
βt+lU
({Cwt+l(i)− γCwt+l−1(i)} ,Mt+lPt+l (i), 1−Hwt+l(i)
)}
, (2.16)
where the period utility function U : R3+ → R is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies
the Inada conditions. There is habit persistence in consumption, captured by γ, to account for
the stylized facts about consumption. In addition, U(.) is assumed to have a constant-relative-
risk aversion (CRRA) form.
The consumption basket and the labour supply of the representative home household are
represented by Cwt (i) and Hwt (i) respectively. Pt is the aggregate level of domestic country price
and Mt(i)/Pt therefore denotes real money balances at the end of period t. In equation (2.16),
β ∈ (0, 1) represents the household’s discount factor, which is related to the inverse of the risk-
free interest rate in credit markets and Et is the conditional expectation operator evaluated at
time t.
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Household consumption is a CES function of domestic and foreign final goods, assembled as
Cwt =
[
ω1/ηcc Cwh,t(ηc−1)/ηc + (1− ωc)1/ηcCwf,t(ηc−1)/ηc
]ηc/(1−ηc)
, ηc > 0. (2.17)
where Cwh,t and C
w
f,t denote consumption of home-produced goods and foreign-produced goods,
respectively. Further, ηc is the elasticity of substitution between home-produced goods and
foreign-produced goods and ωc represents the weight of home-produced goods in the aggregate
domestic consumption. For instance, if ωc > 1/2, then the representative household in the home
country has a home bias in the aggregate consumption.
Next, the home and foreign goods bundles are themselves assumed to be CES aggregates of
differentiated home and foreign-produced goods such as
Cwh,t =
[(
1
ηw
)1/ξc ∫ ηw
0
Cwh,t(i)1−
1
ξc di
] ξc
ξc−1
,
Cwf,t =
[(
1
ηw
)1/ξc ∫ ηw
0
Cwf,t(i)1−
1
ξc di
] ξc
ξc−1
,
(2.18)
where ξc represents the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between goods produced within
each country.8 Consequently, the aggregate price of the final good is a CES function of the home
currency price of goods produced in the home and foreign country
Pt =
[
ωcP(1−ηc)h,t + (1− ωc)P(1−ηc)f,t
]1/(1−ηc)
, (2.19)
whereas the foreign aggregate price is defined analogously (throughout, asterisks denote foreign
variables)
P∗t =
[
ω∗cP∗(1−ηc)h,t + (1− ω∗c )P∗(1−ηc)f,t
]1/(1−ηc)
. (2.20)
where P∗h,t and P∗f,t are, respectively, the foreign currency price of home and foreign-produced
goods. Finally, using the first order conditions, the domestic and foreign composite good are
8Consistent with the assumption of specialization in production, the elasticity of substitution is higher among
brands produced within a country, than across types of national goods, that is, ξc > ηc.
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optimally determined as
Cwh,t = ωc
(Ph,t
Pt
)−ηc
Cwt and Cwf,t = (1− ωc)
(Pf,t
Pt
)−ηc
Cwt . (2.21)
The representative household in the home country holds θbhDh,t units of real deposits in the
home bank and (1 − θbh)Dh,t units of real deposits in the foreign bank. Real deposits pay the
gross interest rate RDh,t in the home country and R
D
f,t in the foreign country.
In period t, domestic workers supply a differentiated labour to home entrepreneurs for which
they receive a nominal wage of Wwt (i). Workers pay taxes on their wage and the tax rates
imposed by the home and foreign country are, respectively, given by τw and τ
∗
w. In contrast
to capital, which is perfectly mobile internationally, labour is assumed to be immobile between
countries. As a result, the typical household’s budget constraint is given by:
Cwt+l(i) +
Mt+l(i)
Pt+l + θ
b
hDh,t+l(i) + (1− θbh)Υt+lDf,t+l(i) = θbh
RDh,tDh,t+l−1(i)
pit+l
Mt+l−1(i)
Pt+l + Υt+l(1− θ
b
h)κt+l
RDf,tDf,t+l−1(i)
pi∗t+l
+ (1− τw)Wwt+lHwt+l(i) + Trt+l(i) ,
(2.22)
where Qt is the nominal exchange rate and Υt = QtP∗t /Pt is the real exchange rate, defined as
the relative price of final goods and Trt+l(i) denotes a lump-sum money transfer from the home
monetary authority to the home domestic household. Further, pit+l and pi
∗
t+l are the domestic
and foreign inflation rate, respectively, and κ(.) represents the premium associated with foreign
deposits. This function captures the costs (or benefits) for home workers of undertaking positions
in international financial markets.9 Finally, a quadratic adjustment cost function is introduced
to penalize swift changes in the stock of physical capital. Thus, with δ representing the depreci-
ation rate of capital, the law of motion for capita is Ih,t = Kh,t− (1− δ)Kh,t−1 + Ψ(Kh,t,Kh,t−1),
where Ψ(., .) represents adjustment costs.10
9Formally, log(κt+l) = $
[
exp
(
Υt+lDf,t+l
Yt+l
)
− 1
]
εet+l, where $ is a parameter that captures the risk of foreign
deposits. Computationally, a premium on the foreign interest rate function is introduced to help the system
have a well-defined steady state. In addition, we add a time-varying shock, εet , to the risk premium function to
capture the changes in the foreign debt. We assume that this shock follows a random walk with drift given by:
log(εet ) = ρe log(ε
e
t−1) + 
e
t , where 
e
t ∼ N(0, 1).
10Ψ(Kh,t,Kh,t−1) = φ2
( Kh,t
Kh,t−1 − 1
)2
Kh,t−1, φ > 0.
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Wage setting:
The decision related to wage setting is made following the New Keynesian framework as in
Smets and Wouters (2007) or Christiano et al. (2010). Each household supplies a differentiated
labour type used by intermediate good producers. The household has monopoly power over its
own-type labour input and sets the wage using Calvo’s partial indexation mechanism. The labour
input supplier aggregates different labour types using the constant-elasticity-of-substitution ag-
gregator Hwt =
(∫ ηw
0 Hwt (i)
ξw−1
ξw di
) ξw
ξw−1
, where 0 ≤ ξw ≤ +∞ is the elasticity of substitution
among different types. This aggregator maximizes profits subject to the production function and
given the price,Wwt (i) of each labour type, and the price of the composite labour input,Wwt . The
first order conditions imply that Hwt (i) =
(Wwt (i)
Wwt
)−ξw Hwt and Wwt = (∫ ηw0 Wwt (i)1−ξwdi) 11−ξw .
Following Calvo (1983), households’ wage setting is as follows: each period, a fraction 1−φw
of households reoptimize their wages, while the remaining φw households cannot change their
wages optimally, but can index it wages to past inflation, with a degree of indexation captured by
χw ∈ (0, 1). This nominal rigidity implies that a household that has reoptimizer for k periods has,
by period t+ k, a wage equal to
k∏
s=1
piχwt+s−1
pit+s
Wwt (i)
Pt . Under the labour demand for each type de-
rived above, demand for the labour of this household is Hwt+k(i) =
(∏k
l=1
piχwt+l−1
pit+l
Wwt (i)
Wwt+k
)−ξw
Lwt+k,
and the overall price for the composite labour input is a geometric average of past and newly
reoptimized wages: pi1−ξwt Wwt 1−ξw = ηw(1− φw)pi1−ξwt W˜w
1−ξw
t + φwWwt−11−ξwpi1−ξwt−1 .
Given preferences and the budget constraint, the home household’s optimization problem
consists of choosing (Cwt (i),Mt+1(i),Dh,t+1(i),Df,t+1(i)) for all t ∈ [0,∞) to maximize lifetime
utility function, Ut(. . . ), as in:
max
{
U
((Cwt (i)− γCwt−1(i)) ,Mt/Pt(i), 1− Lt(i))}
s.t.
 Cwt (i) +Mt(i)/Pt + θbhDh,t(i) + (1− θbh)ΥtDf,t(i) = θbhRDh,tDh,t−1(i)/pit+Mt−1(i)/Pt + Υt(1− θbh)κtRDf,tDf,t−1(i)/pi∗t + (1− τw)Wwt Lt(i) + Trt(i),
where U(.) = log
(Cwt (i)− γCwt−1(i))+ψlog (1− Lt(i))+ζM log (Mt(i)/Pt) and Λt(i) is therefore
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the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint.
Household’s first-order conditions (except for labor and wages) are given by:
1
Cwt (i)− γCwt−1(i)
− βγEt
[
1
Cwt+1(i)− γCwt (i)
]
= Λt(i); (2.23)
ζM
Mt(i)/Pt + βEt
[
Λt+1(i)
pit+1
]
= Λt(i); (2.24)
βEt
[
Λt+1(i)
RDh,t+1
pit+1
]
= Λt(i); (2.25)
βEt
[
Λt+1(i)Υt+1
RDf,t+1
pi∗t+1
]
= ΥtΛt(i); (2.26)
Capital good producers:
As in Bernanke et al. (1999) or Christiano et al. (2010), we assume that there are competitive
physical capital producers in each country. They purchase the newly produced physical capital
as well as the undepreciated physical capital to put new capital in place for period t + 1. The
first order conditions from these producers’ maximization problem lead to:11
βEt
[
Λt+1(i)Qh,t+1
Λt(i)
(
1− δ + φ
(Kh,t+1(i)
Kh,t(i) − 1
) Kh,t+1(i)
Kh,t(i)
)]
=Qh,t
(
1 + φ
( Kh,t(i)
Kh,t−1(i) − 1
))
;
(2.27)
2.2.2 Distribution and Good Production
The distribution sector is composed of intermediate and final good producers. Domestic inter-
mediate goods producers consist of domestic and foreign firms operating under monopolistic
competition. Output produced by these producers is then assembled into a composite domes-
tic good and a composite foreign good by perfectly competitive firms. Finally, this domestic
composite good is combined with imported foreign goods to produce the final good, which is
11Derivations of this equation is documented in Christiano et al. (2010)
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allocated to consumption and investment.
2.2.3 Intermediate Good Production
Domestic Intermediate Good Production:
Intermediate goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms under nominal rigidities
a` la Calvo (1983). The producer of good j combines rented capital K˜t(j) with the labour supply
of households, bankers and entrepreneurs to produce the differentiated intermediate goods Yt.
A fraction of this intermediate good is used to produce the composite domestic good and the
remaining part, Yxt , is exported. Each intermediate good producer j has access to a production
function represented by
Yt(j) = aYt f
(
K˜t,Hwt ,Het ,Hbt
)
−Θ, (2.28)
where the non-negative parameter Θ represents fixed costs of production and aYt is a serially
correlated technology shock that follows the stochastic process log(aYt ) = (1 − ρa) log(aY) +
ρalog(a
Y
t−1) + 
Y
t .
12 The cost minimization problem of these producers is given by:
min
Kt(j),Hwt (j),Het (j),Hbt(j)
{
rkt K˜t(j) +Wwt Hwt (j) +WetHet (j) +WbtHbt(j)
}
s.c. Yt(j) = aYt K˜t(j)αkHwt (j)αwHet (j)αeHbt(j)
αb −Θ
K˜t(j) = K˜h,t + K˜f,t
K˜h,t = θehKh,t
K˜f,t = (1− θeh)Kf,t,
(2.29)
where rkt denotes the rental rate on capital services. The nominal wage on the labour inputs
from households, entrepreneurs and bankers are denoted by Wht , Wet and Wbt , respectively. Let
mct be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the production function constraint, which can
be interpreted as the real marginal cost of producing one additional unit of output. The first
order conditions from 2.29 are:
rkt (j) = mct
αkYt(j)
Kt(j) , (2.30)
12Θ is calibrated to ensure that economic profits of capital producer is roughly equal to zero in the equilibrium
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Wwt = mct
αwYt(j)
Hwt (j)
, Wet = mct
αeYt(j)
Het (j)
, Wbt = mct
αbYt(j)
Hbt(j)
. (2.31)
After producing, the home entrepreneur sells the undepreciated capital stock at price Qh,t+1 to
the home capital producer, so that the average rate of return of capital across entrepreneurs is:
Rkh,t =
mct
αkYt(j)
Kh,t(j) +Qh,t+1(1− δ)
Qh,t . (2.32)
Price-setting is as follows. Each period, a fraction 1 − φh of domestic firms can reoptimize
their prices. When allowed to do so, firm chooses an output price P˜h,t(j) to maximize discounted
real profits. The remaining firms can only index their prices to the previous periods’ inflation
rate, with the degree of indexation controlled by χh ∈ (0, 1). An intermediate good producer
j allowed to reoptimize at time t realizes that the chosen price today, P˜h,t(j), will be after l
periods with no reoptimizing
Ph,t+l(j) = (pih,t+1)χh × (pih,t+2)χh × · · · × (pih,t+l−1)χh × Ph,t(j) =
l−1∏
s=1
(pih,t+s)
χhPh,t(j), (2.33)
where pih,t+l = Ph,t+l/Ph,t+l−1. The problem of the reoptimizing firm is then:
max
P˜h,t(j)
Et
∞∑
l=0
(βφh)
lΛt+l
{(
l−1∏
s=1
(pih,t+s)
χh
P˜h,t(j)
Ph,t+l −mct+l
)
Yt+l(j)
}
s.c. Yt+l(j) =
(
l−1∏
s=1
(pih,t+s)
χh
P˜h,t(j)
Ph,t+l
)−ξh
Yt+l,
(2.34)
where Λt+l is the marginal utility of wealth for a firm j after t+ l periods.
Letting Let p˜h,t = P˜h,t/Pt and assuming that all firms of type j adopt the same pricing
strategy, the first order condition relating to optimal pricing of the domestic intermediate good
j leads to
p˜h,t =
ξh
ξh − 1
Et
∞∑
l=0
(βφh)
lΛt+lmct+l
(
l−1∏
s=1
(pih,t+s)
χh
pih,t+s+1
)−ξh
Yt+l(j)
Et
∞∑
l=0
(βφh)
lΛt+l
(
l−1∏
s=1
(piht+s)
χh
piht+s+1
)1−ξh
Yt+l(j)
. (2.35)
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Foreign Intermediate Goods
The domestic economy imports foreign intermediate goods via a continuum of importing
firms indexed by j ∈ (0, 1). There is a monopolistic competition in this market and each good is
an imperfect substitutes for the other in the production of the composite imported good, Yf,t,
which is assembled by a representative competitive firm. Foreign price-setting follows Calvo’s
assumption, as in the home country.13 Each period, a fraction 1 − φf of firms can reoptimize
their prices. When allowed to do so, firm chooses the price of its output, P˜f,t(j), in order to
maximize discounted real profits. Similar to what was the case in the home country price setting,
the first order condition yields
P˜f,t(j) = ξf
1− ξf
Et
∞∑
k=0
(βφf )
kΛt+kΥtYf,t+k(j)
Et
∞∑
k=0
(βφf )
kΛt+kYf,t+k(j)/Pf,t+k
, (2.36)
where ξf represents the elasticity of substitution between differentiated imported goods and st+l
is the real exchange rate, the equivalent to marginal cost of production in the domestic country.
2.2.4 Rest of the economy
Monetary policy is conducted by the home central bank, which manages the short-term nominal
interest rate RDt = (1+r
D
t ) in response to fluctuations in the domestic GDP, Yt, and in consumer
price inflation pit. This Taylor rule allows the central bank to set the nominal interest rate
through open market operations and is specified as14:
log
(
RDh,t/R
D
h
)
= λr log
(
RDh,t−1/R
D
h
)
+ (1− λr)
(
λpilog (pit/pi) + λy log
(Yt/Y))+ log (ϑh,t) ,
(2.37)
with λr ∈ (0, 1). In equation (2.37), pi and Y represent the target level of inflation and
the target level of output of the domestic economy, respectively. The term ϑh,t denotes a
random shock to monetary policy, that follows a first-order autoregressive process given by:
13This Calvo-type staggered price setting in the imported goods market allows to capture incomplete exchange
rate pass-through from import to domestic prices
14The use of the previous period interest rate allows to match the smooth profile in observed interest rate
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log(ϑh,t) = ρh,mp log(ϑh,t−1) + 
h,mp
t , with 
h,mp
t ∼ N(0, 1). The foreign monetary policy vari-
ables ( the interest rate paid for holding foreign bonds, RDf,t, and the foreign inflation, pi
∗
t ) are
both exogenous.15 Formally, we use two stochastic processes to capture the quantitative impact
of the foreign monetary policy shock. Thus,
log
(
RDf,t/R
D
f
)
= λr log
(
RDf,t−1/R
D
f
)
+ (1− λr)
(
λpilog (pi
∗
t /pi
∗) + λy log
(
Y∗t /Y∗
))
+ log (ϑf,t) ,
(2.38)
and log(ϑf,t) = ρf,mp log(ϑf,t−1) + 
f,mp
t where ρf,mp ∈ (0, 1) denotes the persistence of the
foreign monetary policy shock and R
D
f denotes the targeted steady-state value of the foreign
interest rate, RDf,t. The government budget constraint is given by: Gh,t +Mt−1/Pt + Trt =
τwWwt Hwt +Mt/Pt. Government spending is exogenous and determined using the following
stochastic equation: log(Gh,t) = (1 − ρG) log(Gh) + ρG log(Gh,t−1) + G,t, where Gh denotes the
targeted steady-state value of government spendings.
2.3 Market clearing and competitive equilibrium
The market clearing conditions require that the private and government demand be equal to the
supply. In the aggregate, it follows that
Hwt =
∫ ηh
0
Hwt (i)di, Het =
∫ ηe
0
Het (j)dj, Hbt =
∫ ηb
0
Hbt(j)dj; (2.39)
and
Ht = Hwt +Hbt +Het . (2.40)
Exiting banks and entrepreneurs consume the value of their available wealth. This implies the
following for aggregate consumption of entrepreneurs and bankers
Cet =(1− τ e)θeh
∫ ηe
0
(
(1− Γ(ωh))Qh,tKh,t+1(i)Rkh,t(i)
)
di+
(1− θeh)(1− τ e)
∫ ηe
0
(
(1− Γ(ωf ))Qf,tKf,t+1(i)Rkf,t(i)
)
di;
(2.41)
15This assumption is consistent with our small open economy setting in which the foreign monetary variables
are exogenously determined.
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Cbt =(1− τ b)
∫ ηb
0
θeh
(
(Γ(ωh)− µhG(ωh)Qh,tKh,t+1(i)Rkh,t(i)
)
di+
(1− τ b)(1− θef )
∫ ηb
0
(
(Γ(ωf )− µfG(ωf ))Qf,tKf,t+1(i)Rkf,t(i)
)
di.
(2.42)
Equilibrium in the goods markets requires that production be equal to aggregate demand:
Yt = Cwt + Cet + Cbt + It + µhθehG(ωh)Rkh,tQh,tKh,t
+ µf (1− θef )ΥtG(ωf )Rkf,tQf,tKf,t.
(2.43)
Definition (Competitive equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium is defined as a set of
functions for (i) households’ policies Cwt (i), It(i), Kh,t(i) and Kf,t(i) that solve the maximization
problem of the household; (ii) firms’ policies Kt(j), Hwt (j), Het (j), Hb(j), Wet , Wb and Wwt (i)
that solves firms’ maximization problems; (iii) optimal financial contract that solve the maxi-
mization problem associated with the financial contract; (iv) aggregate prices Ph,t, Pf,t and Pt
and (v) saving and consumption decision rules for bankers and entrepreneurs.
3 Model Simulations
In this section we present the results of some quantitative experiments that assess the extent
to which cross-border banking activities affect the transmission of real and financial shocks and
international business cycles.
3.1 Model parametrization
To evaluate how financial frictions in credit markets combined with cross-border banking ac-
tivities affect the propagation of shocks, we set the parameters of our baseline model to reflect
the key features of the Canadian and the U.S. economy. Most of these parameters are widely
used and their values have become standard in the financial frictions literature (Christiano et al.
(2010), Dib (2010) and Meh and Moran (2010)). The home country is calibrated from Canadian
data whereas the foreign country is parametrized from the US data.
In the financial market, parameters that are related to the capital production and the optimal
financial contract between bankers and entrepreneurs are calibrated following Carlstrom and
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Fuerst (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), and Christiano et al. (2010). Accordingly, the steady
state value of the bank’s minimum capital requirement is set to ιh = 20% in Canada and
ιf = 10% in the United States. The monitoring cost is set to µ = 2.5% in both countries and
cross-border banking parameters in the home and foreign country are fixed to θeh = 0.75 and
θef = 0.85. Recall that 1 − θeh and 1 − θef represent the size of foreign demand of fund, and
therefore, θeh = θ
e
h = 1 refers to the case of an absence of cross-border borrowing activities. In
the supply side, it is difficult to measure the actual degree of banking globalization that matches
our model. Thus, the parameters θbh and θ
b
f are set to θ
b
h = θ
b
f = 0.85, which are consistent to
estimations in Christiano et al. (2010).
The remaining parameters governing the financial contract are set following Bernanke et al.
(1999). Accordingly, the steady state risk spreads, Rkh − Rh and Rkf − Rf are set to 200 basis
points, approximately the historical average spread between the prime lending rate and the six-
month Treasury bill rate. The annualized business failure rate, F (ωh) in the home country and
F (ωf ) in the foreign country, are set to 3%, the approximate rate in the Canadian and U.S.
historical data. The ratio of capital to net worth, ∇eh and ∇ef is fixed to 50% in each country,
the approximate value in the Canadian and U.S. data.
In the representative household’s utility function, the weight on labour supply ψ is set to
9.05, which leads to a steady-state value of household work effort equal to 30% of available time.
Following results in Christiano et al. (2010) and Meh and Moran (2010), the parameter indexing
habit formation, γ, is fixed to 0.65.
The household’s discount factor, β, is set to 0.99, implying a long-run nominal interest
rate of 4% annually in both countries. The share of capital in the production function of
intermediate good producers in the home and foreign country, αk = αkh = αkf , is set to 0.36
and the depreciation rate of capital is fixed to 0.025, standard values in the New Keynesian
literature. As we want to reserve a small role in the production for the hours worked by bankers
and entrepreneurs, we set the share of the labour input of households, αw, to 0.63. Then we
choose αb = αe = 0.005, reflecting an equal contribution of bankers and entrepreneurs in the
intermediate good production process which allows entrepreneurs and bankers to always have
non-zero net worth.
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The parameter capturing the fixed costs in the production function, Θ, is set in order to
ensure that the steady state value of profits equals zero. The persistence of the technology shock,
ρa, is set to 0.95 and its standard deviation is 0.0015, which ensure that the model’s simulated
output volatility equal that of observed aggregate data. The nominal price rigidity parameter
as well as the nominal wage-setting parameter are set following Calvo’s model of staggered
price and wage adjustment. As in Christiano et al. (2005), the probability of not reoptimizing
for price and wage setters in the domestic country, φh and φw, are fixed to 0.75 and 0.64,
respectively. The elasticity of of substitution between domestic intermediate goods, ξh, and the
elasticity of substitution between domestic labour types, ξw, are set to 8 and 21, respectively.
The price and wage indexation parameters, χh and χw, are calibrated to 0.15. These values are
estimated in Christensen and Dib (2008) for the U.S. economy and are commonly used in the
literature. Correspondingly, the probability of not reoptimizing for foreign price setters, φf , is
set to 0.5, while the elasticity of substitution between foreign intermediate goods production,
ξf , is calibrated to 8.
Domestic and foreign monetary policy parameters λr, λpi et λy are set of 0.8, 1.5 and 0.1/4,
respectively. These values satisfy the Taylor principle and are consistent with those estimated
in Clarida et al. (2000). The standard deviation of both domestic and foreign monetary policy
shocks is fixed to 0.0016, ρh,mp = ρf,mp = 0.0016, which ensures that a one-standard deviation
shock moves the interest rate by 0.6 percentage points. This value is consistent with the empirical
estimates reported in Christiano et al. (2005).
The remaining parameters and steady-state ratios of the baseline model are set in order to
ensure that the model’s steady state match to standard New-Keynesian models. Thus, household
consumption to GDP is calibrated to be 73%. Also, the investment-to-GDP ratio and Capital-
to-GDP ratio are set 18% and 12. Finally, the domestic good to final good ratio and imported
good to final ratio are set to 70% and 30%. Tables 2 and 3 report the calibration and the
steady-state values of some key variables.
3.2 Findings
In this section we present the simulated path of the main real and financial variables of the
two-country economy in response to real and financial shocks. In this stochastic simulation,
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Table 2: Parameter Calibration: Baseline model
Parameters Description Values
β Discount factor 0.99
Preferences γ Habit formation 0.65
ψ Weight of leisure in utility 9.05
ζM Elasticity of money demand 0.00183
αk Capital share 0.36
Technologies αw Workers labor share 0.6399
and final good αe Entrepreneur labor share 0.00005
production αb Bankers labor share 0.00005
ωc Share of domestic good in final good 0.7
ηc Elasticity of substitution (home and foreign goods) 0.59
δ Depreciation rate of capital 0.02
τw Labor income tax rate 0.25
ρa Autocorrelation of home technology shock 0.95
σ Standard deviation of home technology shock 0.01
F (ωh), F (ωf ) Annualized business failure rate 3%
Financial ∇eh, ∇ef Ratio of capital to net worth 50%
sector µ Monitoring cost 0.025
τe Entrepreneur’s death probability 0.78
τb Banker’s death probability 0.72
ξw Elasticity of labor supply 21
Nominal ξh Elasticity of substitution for domestic goods 8
rigidities ξf Elasticity of substitution for foreign goods 8
φw Wage reoptimization probability 0.64
φh Domestic price reoptimization probability 0.75
φf Foreign price reoptimization probability 0.5
χw Degree of wage indexation 0.15
χh Degree of price indexation 0.15
Monetary λr Taylor rule: Interest smoothing 0.8
policy λpi Taylor rule: inflation coefficient 1.5
λy Taylor rule: GDP coefficient 0.025
ρh,mp Autocorrelation of home monetary policy shock 0.95
ρf,mp Autocorrelation of foreign monetary policy shock 0.95
ρG Autocorrelation of government spending shock 0.98
σh,mp Standard deviation of home monetary policy shock 0.0016
σh,mp Standard deviation of foreign monetary policy shock 0.0016
σG Standard deviation government spending shock 0.0016
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Table 3: Steady-state values and ratios: Baseline model
Parameters Description Values
Steady-state values
Rkh = Rkf Gross real interest rate of investment projects 1.2118
pih = pif Inflation rate 1.02
1/4
R
D
h = R
D
f Gross real interest rate of deposits 1.0101
Steady-state ratios
C˜h/Yh = Households consumption to GDP ratio 61%
C˜f/Yf = Households consumption to GDP ratio 56%
ηbN˜ eh/Yh = ηbN˜ ef /Yf Entrepreneurs net worth to GDP ratio 0.18%
ηeA˜h/Yh = ηeA˜f/Yf Bankers net worth to GDP ratio 0.24%
I˜h/Yh = I˜f/Yf Investment to GDP ratio 22.4%
K˜h/Yh = K˜f/Yf Capital to GDP ratio 12
we focus on three main shocks: (i) a positive productivity shock in the home country; (ii) a
monetary policy tightening in the home country; and (iii) a monetary policy tightening in the
foreign country. These three shocks will allow us to investigate the role of cross-border banking
activities in the transmission of international shocks transmission.
Figures 5, 7 and 9 illustrate the responses of macroeconomic variables (output, consumption,
investment, inflation and the real exchange rate) and Figures 6, 8 and 10 show responses of
financial variables, such as entrepreneurial net worth, banking net worth, the risk premium and
the home-foreign debt ratio defined as ∇eh,h/f = θehQh,tKh,t+1/
[
(1− θef )ΥtQf,tKf,t+1
]
.
The simulations θeh, θ
e
f , θ
b
h and θ
b
f , we compare two models characterized by their size of
cross-border financial activities. The first model is our baseline two-country economy calibrated
from the U.S. and Canadian data in which we allow cross-border lending and borrowing activities
between bankers and entrepreneurs. In this benchmark model, the size of cross-border financial
activities between entrepreneurs and bankers is kept at 25% for the home country (θeh = 0.75)
and 15% for the foreign country (θef = 0.85) and the international deposit parameters are
set to 20% (θbh = θ
b
f = 0.8). These parameters are consistent with those found by Devereux
and Yetman (2010), Ueda (2012) and Guerrieri et al. (2012) and reflect the size of financial
transactions between the U.S. and Canada (BIS, consolidated banking statistics). In our setting,
the Canadian economy is denoted by the home economy whereas the U.S. economy is designated
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to be the foreign economy. The second model considers very limited cross-border banking
activity, by setting θeh = θ
e
f = θ
b
h = θ
b
f = 0.99. This latter economy is a standard two-country
New Keynesian model without international banking activities that we refer to BGG model with
only an international goods market (standard two-country BGG model). Finally, we analyze
bilateral correlations between real and financial variables to assess the role cross-border banking
activities play in the synchronization of international business cycles.
3.2.1 Productivity shock in the home country
In this simulation, we consider a productivity shock that affects the production frontier (recall
that Yt(j) = aYt f
(
K˜t,Hwt ,Het ,Hbt
)
−Θ) and where the stochastic level of productivity aYt evolves
following a first order Markov process:
 log(aYh,t)− log(aYh )
log(aYf,t)− log(aYf )
 =
 ρa 0
0 ρa
 log(aYh,t−1)− log(aYh )
log(aYf,t−1)− log(aYf )
+
 Yh,t
Yf,t
 , (3.1)
where Yh,t and 
Y
f,t are country-specific innovations with mean 0 and equal standard deviation
σ. The serial correlation between these two innovations is captured by ρ, set to 0.3 in the
baseline model. As calibrated, this shock increases the productivity of wholesale goods-producing
sector by one percent (σ = 1%) at the impact and returns to the steady-state level with an
autoregressive parameter of 0.95 (ρa = 0.95).
A positive technology shock expands the production frontier in the home country and lowers
the marginal cost of production. As the supply of home-produced goods increases, prices of
home-produced goods relative to those of foreign-produced goods decline, but given the nominal
stickiness in prices this can only happen gradually, over time. As a consequence, real wages
and real income increase and consumption follows with a slight delay given the habit persis-
tence in preferences. Employment temporally decreases and higher expected returns on capital
stimulate investment (Figure 5). Then, demand of home-produced goods increases, leading to
an important depreciation of the real exchange rate and a deterioration in the terms-of-trade
of the domestic economy. The initial depreciation in the exchange rate raises retail import
prices only gradually given the price stickiness a` la Calvo in the importing goods sector. As
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the relative price adjustments take time, a strong deficit in the current account emerges mainly
because of the positive income effect on imports. The initial deficit in the current account and
the term-of-trade gain in the foreign country leads to a sharing of the wealth effects between
the two economies and as a result, output rises in the foreign country after a slight fall. For-
eign investment increases in the case of no cross-border financial activities and decreases in the
baseline model. In the case of no cross-border banking activities, the positive spillover effect of
the home productivity shock results in a rise of foreign output and investment. However, with a
higher cross-border banking activity, foreign investors will increase their investment in the home
country and bankers will increase their financing toward the home country. As result, home
investment increases more (by 1% additional) and foreign investment decreases.
Figure 6 presents the responses of home and foreign financial variables following the same
positive shock in to home productivity. As the production frontier in the home country expands,
expected returns on capital in the home country increase, pushing up both entrepreneurial and
baking net worth. Foreign entrepreneurial and banking net wealth also increase, because of
positive spillover effects of the home technology shock. However, foreign banking net worth
increases more in the baseline model because it receives the positive spillover effects of the
return on capital from the home country. The total effect on the two countries is greater in
the presence of cross-border banking activities than that in the standard two-country BGG
model. Our results are consistent with those in Ueda (2012) and Dedola and Lombardo (2012),
who find that the financial accelerator, bank capital and exchange rate channels are enhanced
in the presence of cross-border banking activities. Overall, with a positive technology shock
in the home country, we synchronization in the responses of GDP, investment, consumption,
entrepreneurial and banking net worth.
3.2.2 Home and foreign monetary policy shock
Monetary policy in our model affects real activity and relative prices because prices and wages
are not fully flexible in the short run. Monetary policy impacts works by affecting directly the
nominal interest rate, in turn real variables are affected by changes to the real interest rate. For
illustration, Figures 7 and 8 report the responses to a tightening of monetary policy in the home
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country. The rise in the nominal interest rate increases the real interest rate, which leads to a
rise in the cost of funding for home entrepreneurs. As a consequence, net worth decreases and
home output and investment fall. This generates a negative effect on domestic demand, following
the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) mechanism, the exchange rate appreciates in the case
of no cross-border banking. The exchange rate reaction implies an additional transmission
mechanism to the monetary policy shock and generates a further negative contribution to the
home GDP via net exports. As our monetary policy shocks are uncorrelated, a rise in the home
nominal interest rate leads to an increase of home prices relative to foreign prices and this will
create a higher demand of foreign goods. Higher demand of foreign-produced goods leads to a
positive terms-of-trade and a wealth effect that boost foreign consumption and investment in
the long run. As consequence, a tightening of home monetary policy leads to a fall in the foreign
output in the short run because of the expenditure switching effect. An increase in foreign
output provides a positive wealth effect to households so they consume more in the absence of
cross-border banking activities. With cross-border banking activities, foreign households will
increase their deposits and foreign consumption go back to the steady states a little faster
than those in the model without cross-border banking activities. Compared to the standard
BGG model with an international goods market, cross-border banking activities tend to amplify
the transmission channel of the monetary policy shock on output and investment in both the
domestic and the foreign country. However, cross-border banking activities tend to weaken
the impact of shocks on foreign and home consumption because of the cross-border saving
possibility between the two countries. Following a rise in the opportunity cost of funding in
home country, home entrepreneurs and bankers’ net worth decrease. However, without cross-
border banking activities, foreign entrepreneurs’ net worth decreases less because of the relatively
weak opportunity cost of funding in the foreign country.
Foreign monetary policy shock affects the foreign and the home economy by generating
opposite reactions comparing to the home monetary shock, nearly of a same magnitude. This
result is consistent to our prediction since financial frictions are fully represented in the two
countries and because of the symmetry effect in this two-country DSGE model. Thus following
a monetary policy shock in the foreign country, foreign output and investment decrease, whereas
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home investment and output increase.
3.2.3 International business cycle synchronization
Finally, Tables 4 and 5 report bilateral correlations for key macro-financial variables (GDP,
consumption, investment, bankers and entrepreneurs net worth). For this purpose, we consider
two types of shocks: (i) productivity shocks and (ii) monetary policy shocks. For the monetary
policy shock, we set the bilateral correlations of shocks to zero. However, we consider correlated
productivity shocks with a correlation parameter set to (0.3).16 For comparison purposes, the
tables also report bilateral correlations predicted by the so called standard two-country BGG
model and our two-country baseline model. In response to the productivity shock, a bilateral
correlation between home and foreign GDP is 0.28 and the bilateral correlation for investment
is 12% without cross-border baking and 42% in the baseline model. The bilateral correlation
between home and foreign investment is -24% in the standard two-country model and 32% in
the baseline model. Entrepreneurs and Bankers net worth are less sensitive to the interna-
tional banking activities. However, the bilateral correlation between entrepreneurs and bankers
net worth is higher under cross-border banking. In response to the monetary policy shock, a
bilateral correlation for GDP is -5% and the bilateral correlation for investment is -91%. Un-
der cross-border banking, a bilateral correlation for GDP is 8% and the bilateral correlation for
investment is -77%. The cross-correlation between consumption is 10% under cross-border bank-
ing, whereas is negative in the standard two-country BGG model. In the financial market, the
cross-correlation of entrepreneur and bankers net worth moves from -19% without cross-banking
activities to 93% under cross-border banking. Standard open economy macro models without
banks (Backus et al. (1995), Baxter (1995), Kehoe and Perri (2002)) too generate cross-country
correlations of output and investment that are lower than the empirical cross-country correla-
tions. Overall, under cross-border banking, predicted bilateral correlations become greater than
those without international banking activities in many cases.
16This parameter is consistent with the empirical correlations found in Ueda (2012).
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4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a two-country DSGE model with real-financial linkages to address
the role played by cross-border banking activities on the dynamics of shock propagation and
in the synchronization of international business cycles. The model includes an international
credit contract between bankers and investors, on the one hand, and between bankers and
entrepreneurs, on the other. This introduces cross-border lending and borrowing and enhances
integration of financial markets between the two countries. The model economy is calibrated to
U.S. and Canadian data.
Our simulations suggest that following a positive technology shock and a tightening of home
monetary policy, cross-border banking activities tend to amplify the transmission channel on
output and investment in both the domestic and the foreign country. However, cross-border
banking activities tend to weaken the impact of shocks on foreign and home consumption,
because of the cross-border saving possibility between the countries.
Furthermore, our simulations suggest that in the presence of cross-border banking, bilat-
eral correlations between macroeconomic aggregates become greater. Overall, our results show
sizable spillover effects of cross-border banking in the propagation of shocks and suggest cross-
border banking is an important source of the synchronization of business cycles between the
U.S. and Canada.
Going forward, more research is needed to provide better macro and microfoundations of
Canada-U.S. interdependence coming from international banking activities. In addition, es-
timating the two-country DSGE would allow the introduction of more shocks than observed
variables and therefore properly test and identify common factors in the structural shocks.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of the proposition 3
With our specification, the expected return received by the bank at the end of the financial
contract in bot countries are defined as:
Zbh,t+1 =
V bh (θ
e
h, θ
e
f )(
θeh
(
Qh,tKh,t+1 −N eh,t+1
)
+ (1− θef )Υt
(
Qf,tKf,t+1 −N ef,t+1
)) ,
and
Zbf,t+1 =
V bf (θ
e
h, θ
e
f )(
(1− θeh)
(
Qh,tKh,t+1 −N eh,t+1
)
+ θefΥt
(
Qf,tKf,t+1 −N ef,t+1
)) ,
Using equations (2.3) and (2.4), the expected return may be rewritten as:
Zbh,t+1 =
θeh
(
Qh,tKh,t+1 −N eh,t+1
)
Rh,t+1 + (1− θef )Υt
(
Qf,tKf,t+1 −N ef,t+1
)
Rf,t+1
θeh
(
Qh,tKh,t+1 −N eh,t+1
)
+ (1− θef )Υt
(
Qf,tKf,t+1 −N ef,t+1
) ,
Zbf,t+1 =
(1− θeh)
(
Qh,tKh,t+1 −N eh,t+1
)
Rh,t+1 + θ
e
fΥt
(
Qf,tKf,t+1 −N ef,t+1
)
Rf,t+1
(1− θeh)
(
Qh,tKh,t+1 −N eh,t+1
)
+ θefΥt
(
Qf,tKf,t+1 −N ef,t+1
) ,
Denote by ∇eh,f/h =
(
(1− θef )ΥtQf,tKf,t+1
)
/θehQh,tKh,t+1, and ∇eh,h/f =
(
∇eh,f/h
)−1
. ∇ef,f/h =
θefΥtQf,tKf,t+1/ ((1− θeh)Qh,tKh,t+1), and ∇ef,h/f =
(
∇ef,f/h
)−1
:
Hence:
Zbh,t+1 =
1−∇eh(
1−∇eh
)
+∇eh,f/h
(
1−∇ef
)Rh,t+1 + 1−∇ef(
1−∇ef
)
+∇eh,h/f
(
1−∇eh
)Rf,t+1,
Zbf,t+1 =
1−∇eh(
1−∇eh
)
+∇ef,f/h
(
1−∇ef
)Rh,t+1 + 1−∇ef(
1−∇ef
)
+∇ef,h/f
(
1−∇eh
)Rf,t+1.
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5.2 Analytical Expressions for the Variables Appearing in the Credit Con-
tracts
In this section we lay out the analytical expression to compute Gt(ωh), Gt(ωf ), Γt(ωh) and
Γt(ωf ). Following Bernanke et al. (1999) and Christiano et al. (2010), we assume that ωh
and ωf follow log-normal distributions, with Et [ωh] = Et [ωf ] = 1. We denote the cumulative
distribution function of the two random variables by Ft (ωh) and Ft (ωf ), and we assume that
the variance of log (ωh) and log (ωf ) are σ
2
ωh
and σ2ωf , respectively.
Gt(ωh), Gt(ωf ) are the expected return from the default entrepreneurs in the home and
foreign country, respectively. Using the log-normal assumption, they may be expressed as:
Gt (ωh) =
1√
2pi
∫ log(ωh)− 12σ2ωh
σωh
−∞
. exp
(
−ϑ
2
h
2
)
dϑh, (5.1)
Gt (ωf ) =
1√
2pi
∫ log(ωf)− 12σ2ωf
σωf
−∞
. exp
(
−ϑ
2
f
2
)
dϑf . (5.2)
Γt(ωh) and Γt(ωf ) are the net share profit going to bankers in the setting of the financial
contract. Again, using the log-normal assumption, they may expressed as:
Γt (ωh) =
1√
2pi
∫ log(ωh)− 12σ2ωh
σωh
−∞
. exp
(
−ϑ
2
h
2
)
dϑh +
ωh√
2pi
∫ +∞
log(ωh)+
1
2σ
2
ωh
σωh
. exp
(
−ϑ
2
h
2
)
dϑh, (5.3)
Γt (ωf ) =
1√
2pi
∫ log(ωf)− 12σ2ωf
σωf
−∞
. exp
(
−ϑ
2
f
2
)
dϑf +
ωf√
2pi
∫ +∞
log(ωf)+ 12σ2ωf
σωf
. exp
(
−ϑ
2
f
2
)
dϑf . (5.4)
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Figure 5: IRF of real variables from a home productivity shock
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Notes: This figure presents impulse response functions from the simulated DSGE model to illustrate the effect of
cross-border banking activities on the transmission of a shock to home productivity. Responses are expressed in
percentage deviation except inflation and interest rate variables, which are expressed in basis points.
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Figure 6: IRF of financial variables from a home productivity shock
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Notes: This figure presents impulse response functions from the simulated DSGE model to illustrate the effect of
cross-border banking activities on the transmission of a shock to home productivity. Responses are expressed in
percentage deviation except inflation and interest rate variables, which are expressed in basis points.
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Figure 7: IRF of real variables from a home monetary policy shock
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Notes: This figure presents impulse response functions from the simulated DSGE model to illustrate the effect of
cross-border banking activities on the transmission of a home monetary policy shock. Responses are expressed in
percentage deviation except inflation and interest rate variables, which are expressed in basis points.
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Figure 8: IRF of financial variables from a home monetary policy shock
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Notes: This figure presents impulse response functions from the simulated DSGE model to illustrate the effect of
cross-border banking activities on the transmission of a home monetary policy shock. Responses are expressed in
percentage deviation except inflation and interest rate variables, which are expressed in basis points.
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Figure 9: IRF of real variables from a foreign monetary shock
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Notes: This figure presents impulse response functions from the simulated DSGE model to illustrate the effect of
cross-border banking activities on the transmission of a foreign monetary policy shock. Responses are expressed
in percentage deviation except inflation and interest rate variables, which are expressed in basis points.
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Figure 10: IRF of financial variables from a foreign monetary shock
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Notes: This figure presents impulse response functions from the simulated DSGE model to illustrate the effect of
cross-border banking activities on the transmission of home monetary policy shock. Responses are expressed in
percentage deviation except inflation and interest rate variables, which are expressed in basis points.
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Table 4: Predicted Bilateral Correlations (home productivity shock)
Variables Model Yh Yf Ch Cf Ih If N eh N ef Ah Af
Yh BGG 1.00 0.12 0.78 0.53 0.79 0.03 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.79Baseline 1.00 0.42 0.80 0.52 0.85 0.30 0.75 0.68 0.75 0.68
Yf BGG 0.12 1.00 0.53 0.81 0.07 0.79 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.19Baseline 0.42 1.00 0.52 0.84 0.27 0.87 0.35 0.44 0.35 0.44
Ch BGG 0.78 0.53 1.00 0.58 0.40 0.17 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.55Baseline 0.80 0.52 1.00 0.51 0.47 0.27 0.57 0.50 0.57 0.50
Cf BGG 0.53 0.81 0.58 1.00 0.17 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48Baseline 0.52 0.84 0.51 1.00 0.24 0.57 0.53 0.60 0.53 0.60
Ih BGG 0.79 0.07 0.40 0.17 1.00 -0.24 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.61Baseline 0.85 0.27 0.47 0.24 1.00 0.32 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.54
If BGG 0.03 0.79 0.17 0.47 -0.24 1.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06Baseline 0.30 0.87 0.27 0.57 0.32 1.00 0.25 0.30 0.25 0.30
N eh
BGG 0.75 0.35 0.57 0.53 0.55 0.25 1.00 0.87 1.00 0.87
Baseline 0.76 0.24 0.54 0.48 0.63 -0.06 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.98
N ef
BGG 0.68 0.44 0.50 0.60 0.54 0.30 0.87 1.00 0.87 1.00
Baseline 0.79 0.19 0.55 0.48 0.61 -0.06 0.98 1.00 0.98 1.00
Ah BGG 0.75 0.35 0.57 0.53 0.55 0.25 1.00 0.87 1.00 0.87Baseline 0.76 0.24 0.54 0.48 0.63 -0.06 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.98
Af BGG 0.68 0.44 0.50 0.60 0.54 0.30 0.87 1.00 0.87 1.00Baseline 0.79 0.19 0.55 0.48 0.61 -0.06 0.98 1.00 0.98 1.00
Notes: This table shows bilateral correlations between the home and the foreign country for a positive home
productivity shock. For illustration, we consider two kinds of models: (i) A standard BGG model with an
international goods market without cross-border banking activities; and (ii) our baseline model with cross-border
banking parameters calibrated from the U.S. and Canadian Economy.
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Table 5: Predicted Bilateral Correlations (home monetary shock)
Variables Model Yh Yf Ch Cf Ih If N eh N ef Ah Af
Yh BGG 1.00 -0.05 0.52 0.55 0.57 -0.34 0.72 0.85 0.72 0.85Baseline 1.00 0.08 0.86 0.13 0.64 -0.37 0.76 -0.14 0.76 -0.14
Yf BGG -0.05 1.00 0.31 0.31 -0.19 0.35 -0.46 -0.43 -0.46 -0.43Baseline 0.08 1.00 0.11 0.76 -0.19 0.47 -0.15 -0.21 -0.15 -0.21
Ch BGG 0.52 0.31 1.00 -0.06 0.46 -0.30 0.25 0.21 0.25 0.21Baseline 0.86 0.11 1.00 0.10 0.68 -0.58 0.52 -0.30 0.52 -0.30
Cf BGG 0.55 0.31 -0.06 1.00 0.07 -0.03 0.11 0.36 0.11 0.36Baseline 0.13 0.76 0.10 1.00 -0.37 0.30 0.04 -0.27 0.04 -0.27
Ih BGG 0.57 -0.19 0.46 0.07 1.00 -0.91 0.46 0.54 0.46 0.54Baseline 0.64 -0.19 0.68 -0.37 1.00 -0.77 0.51 -0.46 0.51 -0.46
If BGG -0.34 0.35 -0.30 -0.03 -0.91 1.00 -0.30 -0.38 -0.30 -0.38Baseline -0.37 0.47 -0.58 0.30 -0.77 1.00 -0.35 0.56 -0.35 0.56
N eh
BGG 0.76 -0.15 0.52 0.04 0.51 -0.35 1.00 -0.19 1.00 -0.19
Baseline 0.72 -0.46 0.25 0.11 0.46 -0.30 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.93
N ef
BGG -0.14 -0.21 -0.30 -0.27 -0.46 0.56 -0.19 1.00 -0.19 1.00
Baseline 0.85 -0.43 0.21 0.36 0.54 -0.38 0.93 1.00 0.93 1.00
Ah BGG 0.76 -0.15 0.52 0.04 0.51 -0.35 1.00 -0.19 1.00 -0.19Baseline 0.72 -0.46 0.25 0.11 0.46 -0.30 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.93
Af BGG -0.14 -0.21 -0.30 -0.27 -0.46 0.56 -0.19 1.00 -0.19 1.00Baseline 0.85 -0.43 0.21 0.36 0.54 -0.38 0.93 1.00 0.93 1.00
Notes: This table shows bilateral correlations between the home and the foreign country for a tightening home
monetary policy. For illustration, we consider two kinds of models: (i) A standard BGG model with an inter-
national goods market without cross-border banking activities; and (ii) our baseline model with cross-border
banking parameters calibrated from the U.S. and Canadian Economy.
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